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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In early 2015, the United States Supreme Court will hear oral 
argument in Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar,1 a case arising out of 
a judicial election in Florida. Williams-Yulee, a judicial candidate, 
personally solicited campaign contributions in violation of a Florida 
law prohibiting judicial candidates from making such solicitations 
 
 *  Professor of Law, University of Kansas School of Law. Thanks to Nicole Smith, Mark 
Wilkins, and Abigail West for helpful research assistance.  
 1.  138 So.3d 379 (Fla.), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 44 (2014).  
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personally, as opposed to doing so through the candidate’s campaign 
committee.2 Williams-Yulee contends that this Florida law violates 
her First Amendment right to freedom of speech. However, the Florida 
Supreme Court rejected that argument and held that prohibiting 
judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign funds is a 
constitutionally permissible restriction on speech because it is 
narrowly tailored to promote “the State’s compelling interests in 
preserving the integrity of the judiciary and maintaining the public’s 
confidence in an impartial judiciary.”3 
At the level of constitutional law then, Williams-Yulee is a 
First Amendment case about judicial campaign fundraising.4 The First 
Amendment issues raised by judicial campaigns5 and money in 
politics6 are vital, and they are not the only issues implicated by 
Williams-Yulee. Williams-Yulee also implicates broader questions 
about how judicial election campaigns should be funded and 
ultimately whether to have judicial elections at all. I bring to 
Williams-Yulee a longstanding interest in a wide range of legal and 
policy issues surrounding judicial selection,7 including issues 
 
 2.  Id. at 381, 383–84. 
 3.  Id. at 381. 
 4.  The question presented in the Petition for Certiorari in Williams-Yulee v. The Florida 
Bar is “[w]hether a rule of judicial conduct that prohibits candidates for judicial office from 
personally soliciting campaign funds violates the First Amendment.” Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari at 3, Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 138 So.3d 379 (No. 13-1499) (June 17, 2014), 
2014 WL 2769040 at *i.  
 5.  See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002) (holding that 
Minnesota Supreme Court's canon of judicial conduct, which prohibited candidates for judicial 
election from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues, violated the First 
Amendment). 
 6.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (upholding disclosure 
requirements for political advertising sponsors and ban on direct contributions to candidates 
from corporations and unions, but invalidating limits on independent expenditures by 
corporations and labor unions); McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding limits on “soft-
money” contributions and political advertisements because of the government’s interest in 
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption in elections); FEC v. Colo. Republican Fed. 
Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431 (2001) (upholding limitations on coordinated spending by 
political parties); Colo. Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (deciding 
that campaign spending by political parties on behalf of congressional candidates could not be 
limited as long as the parties work independently of the candidates); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976) (holding that limits on campaign expenditures unconstitutionally restricted protected 
political expression, but allowing reasonable restrictions on contributions to candidates).  
 7.  See Stephen J. Ware, The Bar’s Extraordinarily Powerful Role in Selecting the Kansas 
Supreme Court, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 392 (2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1478660, archived at http://perma.cc/3HLW-
E4WN; Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751 (2009), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1518029, archived at 
http://perma.cc/H4Z9-GPXS; Stephen J. Ware, Originalism, Balanced Legal Realism and 
Judicial Selection: A Case Study, 22 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 165 (2013), available at 
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surrounding the extent and implications of correlations between 
judicial campaign contributions and judges’ rulings.8 Williams-Yulee 
seems an opportune time to reconsider my and others’ longstanding 
concerns about judicial elections. 
II. PROHIBITING JUDICIAL CANDIDATES FROM PERSONALLY SOLICITING 
CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS 
A. Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar 
According to her Florida Supreme Court brief, Lanell Williams-
Yulee decided in September 2009 to run for Group 10 County Court 
Judge in Hillsborough County, Florida,9 a seat then occupied by Judge 
Dick Greco, Jr., who had not yet announced whether he would seek 
reelection.10 Williams-Yulee had never been a judicial candidate 
before, nor had she ever run for a publicly elected office. After she 
registered as a judicial candidate and formed a campaign committee, 
Williams-Yulee and her committee drafted a letter announcing her 
candidacy and seeking campaign contributions. Before signing the 
letter, Williams-Yulee reviewed it in light of the Florida Code of 
Judicial Conduct Canon 7(C)1 which provides: 
A candidate . . . for a judicial office that is filled by public election between competing 
candidates shall not personally solicit campaign funds, or solicit attorneys for publicly 
stated support, but may establish committees of responsible persons to secure and 
manage the expenditure of funds for the candidate’s campaign and to obtain public 
statements of support for his or her candidacy. Such committees are not prohibited from 
 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2129265, archived at http://perma.cc/UDE5-
7FD3 [hereinafter Originalism]; Stephen J. Ware, Selection to the Kansas Supreme Court, 17 
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 386 (2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1315493, archived at http://perma.cc/GWK6-EY3Y. 
 8.  Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration 
Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645 (1999), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=262579, archived at http://perma.cc/2GX9-AFBL; see also Joanna 
Shepherd & Michael S. Kang, SKEWED JUSTICE: CITIZENS UNITED, TELEVISION ADVERTISING, 
AND STATE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES’ DECISIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, www.skewedjustice.org 
(last visited Dec. 25, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/N52M-3DTC:  
The more TV ads aired during state supreme court judicial elections in a state, the 
less likely justices are on average to vote in favor of criminal defendants. Justices in 
states whose bans on corporate and union spending on elections [were struck down by 
the Supreme Court] were less likely on average to vote in favor of criminal defendants 
than they were before that decision. 
 9.  Initial Brief of Respondent Lanell Williams-Yulee at 3, The Florida Bar v. Williams-
Yulee, 138 So.3d 379 (No. SC11-265) (Sept. 2012), 2012 WL 5275028 at *3; Amended Answer 
Brief at 1, The Florida Bar v. Williams-Yulee, 138 So.3d 379 (No. SC11-265) (Oct. 2012), 2012 
WL 10067893 at *1. 
 10.  Initial Brief of Respondent Lanell Williams-Yulee, supra note 9, at 4–6; Amended 
Answer Brief, supra note 9, at 2.  
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soliciting campaign contributions and public support from any person or corporation 
authorized by law.11 
Williams-Yulee’s Florida Supreme Court brief says Williams-Yulee 
was aware that Canon 7(C)1 prohibited personal solicitation of 
campaign funds but mistakenly believed that prohibition only applied 
to an election in which there were competing candidates.12 As noted 
above, when Williams-Yulee signed the fundraising letter, there were 
no competing candidates. Only later did Judge Greco declare his 
candidacy for reelection and defeat Williams-Yulee in the 2010 
primary election.13 
The Florida Bar filed a complaint with the Florida Supreme 
Court alleging that Williams-Yulee’s letter personally soliciting 
campaign contributions violated Canon 7C(1).14 A referee, appointed 
by the chief justice,15 rejected Williams-Yulee’s argument that Canon 
7C(1) “would apply only if there were another candidate in the judicial 
race,”16 and stated that “[i]t is clear that the use of ‘election between 
competing candidates’ [in Canon 7C(1)] is used to describe the type of 
judicial office where the prohibition would apply.”17 Accordingly, the 
referee recommended to the Florida Supreme Court that Williams-
Yulee be found guilty and receive a public reprimand.18 
Williams-Yulee requested review by the Florida Supreme 
Court19 and argued “Canon 7C(1) is unconstitutional in that it limits a 
 
 11.  CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT FOR THE STATE OF FLA., Canon 7C(1) (2014). As a lawyer, 
Williams-Yulee was bound to comply with the Code of Judicial Conduct under the Rules 
Regulating the Florida Bar, in particular Rule 4-8.2(b) which provides: “A lawyer who is a 
candidate for judicial office shall comply with the applicable provisions of Florida’s Code of 
Judicial Conduct.” R. REGULATING THE FLA. BAR 4-8.2(b) (1992). 
12  Initial Brief of Respondent Lanell Williams-Yulee, supra note 9, at 4. 
 13.  See 2010 PRIMARY ELECTION, HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY ELECTIONS, 
http://results.enr.clarityelections.com/FL/Hillsborough/20674/32245/en/summary.html# (last 
updated Aug. 27, 2010, 1:12:31 PM), archived at http://perma.cc/2DGM-5VTY.  
 14.  See Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 138 So.3d 379, 381–82 (Fla.), cert. granted, 135 
S. Ct. 44 (2014).  
 15.  See R. REGULATING THE FLA. BAR 3-7.6(a)(1) (1992) (“The chief justice shall have the 
power to appoint referees to try disciplinary cases . . . .”). 
 16.  Williams-Yulee, 138 So.3d at 382. 
 17.  Id.  
 18.  Id. at 381; see also R. REGULATING THE FLA. BAR 3-7.6(m) (1992): 
[T]he referee shall make a report and enter it as part of the record . . . . The referee’s 
report shall include[, inter alia, findings of fact, recommendations of guilt, and 
recommendations of disciplinary measures] . . . . The referee’s report and record of 
proceedings shall in all cases be transmitted together to the Supreme Court of 
Florida. 
 19.  Williams-Yulee, 138 So.3d at 383; see R. REGULATING THE FLA. BAR 3-7.7(a) (1992) (“(1) 
Any party to a proceeding may procure review of a report of a referee . . . entered under these 
rules. (2) The Supreme Court of Florida shall review all reports and judgments of referees 
recommending . . . public reprimand . . . .”). 
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judicial candidate’s right to engage in free speech by prohibiting a 
judicial candidate from directly soliciting campaign contributions.”20 
Although the Florida Supreme Court recognized that restrictions on 
speech “ ‘must be supported by a compelling, governmental interest 
and must be narrowly drawn to insure that there is no more 
infringement than is necessary,’ ”21 it held that Canon 7C(1) “is 
constitutional because it promotes the State’s compelling interests in 
preserving the integrity of the judiciary and maintaining the public’s 
confidence in an impartial judiciary, and . . . is narrowly tailored to 
effectuate those interests.”22 Williams-Yulee petitioned the United 
States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the 
constitutionality of Canon 7C(1).23 The petition was granted on 
October 2, 2014.24 
B. Beyond Florida 
Florida’s prohibition on judicial candidates personally soliciting 
campaign funds is not unusual. Most, but not all,25 states require that 
such solicitation be conducted through a campaign committee,26 and 
 
 20.  Williams-Yulee, 138 So.3d at 383. 
 21.  Id. at 384 (quoting Firestone v. News-Press Publ’g Co., 538 So.2d 457, 459 (Fla. 1989)). 
 22.  Williams-Yulee, 138 So.3d at 381. Accordingly, the court approved the referee’s 
recommendation that Williams-Yulee be found guilty of violating Rule 4-8.2(b) and concluded 
that the referee’s recommended sanction of public reprimand was appropriate. Id. at 381, 389. 
 23.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 4. 
 24.  Williams-Yulee v. The Florida Bar, 135 S. Ct. 44 (No. 13-1499) (Oct. 2, 2014), 2014 WL 
2763710 at *1. 
 25.  See, e.g., KAN. SUP. CT. R. 601B, CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 4, Rule 4.4:  
A judicial candidate for retention, nonpartisan, or partisan election may establish a 
campaign committee to manage and conduct a campaign for the candidate, subject to 
the provisions of this Code. The candidate is responsible for ensuring that his or her 
campaign committee complies with applicable provisions of this Code and other 
applicable law. A judicial candidate may also personally solicit or accept campaign 
contributions.  
(emphasis added). 
 26.  Williams-Yulee, 138 So.3d at 386 n.2: 
With respect to judicial races involving either an opposed election or retention with 
active opposition, the majority of states require that the solicitation for judicial 
campaign funds be conducted through a campaign committee. See, e.g., ALASKA CODE 
OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 5C(3); ARIZ. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 4, R. 4.1(A)(6); 
ARK. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 4, R. 4.2(B)(1); COLO. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, 
CANON 4, R. 4.3(A); CONN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 5A(4); IDAHO CODE OF JUD. 
CONDUCT, CANON 5C(2); ILL. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 7B(2); IND. CODE OF JUD. 
CONDUCT, CANON 4, R. 4.4(A); IOWA CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 4, R. 51:4.4(A); 
KY. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 5B(2); LA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 
7C(2)(B); ME. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 5C(3); MICH. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, 
CANON 7B(2)(B); MINN. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 4, R. 4.4(A); MISS. CODE OF 
JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 5C(2); MO. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 4, R. 2–4.2(B); 
MONT. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 4, R. 4.4(A); NEB. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, 
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the American Bar Association Model Code of Judicial Conduct says “a 
judge or a judicial candidate shall not . . . personally solicit or accept 
campaign contributions other than through a campaign committee.”27 
In short, prohibitions on judicial candidates personally soliciting 
campaign contributions are the norm around the country and are 
widely supported by the bar, including the state supreme court 
justices around the country who (rather than legislators) typically 
enact them. 
Because prohibitions on judicial candidates personally 
soliciting campaign contributions are so widespread and so well-
established, it is no surprise that they were considered by courts 
before Williams-Yulee. In fact, both the Oregon and Arkansas 
Supreme Courts had, before Williams-Yulee, considered First 
Amendment challenges to their states’ prohibitions on judicial 
candidates personally soliciting campaign contributions.28 Both courts 
rejected those challenges on similar reasoning and Williams-Yulee 
cited them both.29 Thus, three states’ highest courts have held that 
prohibiting judicial candidates’ personal solicitation of campaign 
contributions serves a compelling state interest and that the 
prohibition is narrow enough to ensure that there is no more 
restriction on speech than needed to protect that interest. 
III. JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY 
A. Judicial Impartiality Can Coexist with Legitimate  
Judicial Lawmaking 
All three state supreme courts upholding prohibitions on 
judicial candidates’ personally soliciting campaign funds did so 
because they believed these prohibitions advanced the states’ interest 
 
CANON 4, R. 5–304.1(A)(8); N.M. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 4, R. 21–404A; N.Y. 
CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 5(A)(5); N.D. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 4, R. 
4.6; OHIO CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 4, R. 4.4(A); OKLA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, 
CANON 4, R. 4.4(A); OR. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, R. 4–102(D); PA. CODE OF JUD. 
CONDUCT, CANON 7B(2); S.C. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 5C(2); TENN. CODE OF 
JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 4, R. 4.4; UTAH CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 4, R. 4.2(B)(2); 
VT. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 5C(3); WASH. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 4, 
R. 4.4; W. VA. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 5C(2); WIS. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, R. 
60.06(4); WYO. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 4, R. 4.2(B)(4). 
 27.  A.B.A. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 4.1(A)(8) (2011). 
 28.  Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n, 247 S.W.3d 876, 881–82 (Ark. 
2007); In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 41 (Or. 1990). 
 29.  Williams-Yulee, 138 So.3d at 386 (“[T]hese types of provisions are constitutional, as one 
of a constellation of provisions designed to ensure that judges engaged in campaign activities are 
able to maintain their status as fair and impartial arbiters of the law.” (citing Simes, 247 S.W.3d 
at 884; In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d at 44)). 
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in judicial impartiality. In Williams-Yulee, the Florida Supreme Court 
held that Canon 7C(1), prohibiting Williams-Yulee’s personal 
solicitation of campaign funds, “promotes the State’s compelling 
interests in preserving the integrity of the judiciary and maintaining 
the public’s confidence in an impartial judiciary.”30 Similarly, the 
Oregon Supreme Court upheld its similar prohibition after finding the 
state had a compelling interest in maintaining the public’s “faith in 
the impartiality of its judiciary,”31 and the Arkansas Supreme Court 
upheld its similar prohibition as advancing compelling state interests 
in (1) ensuring “judicial impartiality” and (2) ensuring “the public’s 
trust and confidence in the integrity of [the] judicial system” by 
“avoiding the appearance of impropriety.”32 
With judicial impartiality central to all three decisions 
upholding prohibitions on judicial candidates’ personally soliciting 
campaign funds, assessing these decisions requires unpacking the 
meaning of judicial “impartiality.” The “root meaning” of judicial 
impartiality, according to the United States Supreme Court, is “lack of 
bias for or against either party to the proceeding. Impartiality in this 
sense assures equal application of the law. That is, it guarantees a 
party that the judge who hears his case will apply the law to him in 
the same way he applies it to any other party.”33 The Court adopted 
this definition of impartiality in the 2002 case of Republican Party of 
 
 30.  Williams-Yulee, 138 So.3d at 381, 385 (emphasis added). 
 31.  In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d at 41 (emphasis added); see id. at 32 (“A judge may not . . . 
personally solicit campaign contributions; but a judge may establish committees to secure and 
manage financing and expenses to promote the judge’s election and to obtain public statements 
of support for the judge’s candidacy . . . .” (quoting OR. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 7B(7))) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). Today, the rule reads: 
[A] judge or judicial candidate shall not . . . . personally solicit or accept campaign 
contributions other than through a lawfully established campaign committee except, 
so long as the procedures employed are not coercive, a judge or judicial candidate may 
solicit or accept campaign contributions from members of the judge’s family and 
judges over whom the judge does not exercise supervisory or appellate authority[.]  
OR. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, R. 5.1(E) (West 2013). Rule 5.1(E) is adapted from Rule 4.1(A)(8) of 
the current ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT (2007), 
available at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/judicialethics/ 
ABA_MCJC_approved.authcheckdam.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7AA2-KJQQ.  
 32.  Simes, 247 S.W.3d at 882–83 (emphasis added); see id. at 879 (quoting ARK. CODE OF 
JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5C(2)) (“A candidate shall not personally solicit or accept campaign 
contributions. A candidate may, however, establish committees of responsible persons to conduct 
campaigns for the candidate . . . .”). Today, the Canon reads: “A judge or candidate for judicial 
office shall not engage in political or campaign activity that is inconsistent with the 
independence, integrity, or impartiality of the judiciary.” ARK. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, CANON 4 
(West 2009). Rule 4.1(A)(8) of the Canon states: “[A] judge or a judicial candidate shall not . . . . 
personally solicit or accept campaign contributions other than through a campaign 
committee . . . .” ARK. CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, R. 4.1(A)(8) (West 2009). 
 33.  Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775–76 (2002). 
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Minnesota v. White,34 which held that prohibiting judicial candidates 
from announcing their views on disputed legal and political issues 
violates the First Amendment. While White endorses this “equal 
application of the law” meaning of impartiality as a compelling state 
interest,35 White rejected—as not a compelling interest—impartiality 
“to mean lack of preconception in favor of or against a particular legal 
view.”36 As White rightly said: 
This sort of impartiality would be concerned, not with guaranteeing litigants equal 
application of the law, but rather with guaranteeing them an equal chance to persuade 
the court on the legal points in their case. Impartiality in this sense . . . is not a 
compelling state interest . . . . A judge’s lack of predisposition regarding the relevant 
legal issues in a case has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice, 
and with good reason. For one thing, it is virtually impossible to find a judge who does 
not have preconceptions about the law. As then-Justice REHNQUIST observed of our 
own Court: “Since most Justices come to this bench no earlier than their middle years, it 
would be unusual if they had not by that time formulated at least some tentative 
notions that would influence them in their interpretation of the sweeping clauses of the 
Constitution and their interaction with one another.”37 
White also questioned whether impartiality of this sort would even be 
desirable in the judiciary: 
Indeed, even if it were possible to select judges who did not have preconceived views on 
legal issues, it would hardly be desirable to do so. “Proof that a Justice’s mind at the 
time he joined the Court was a complete tabula rasa in the area of constitutional 
adjudication would be evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.” . . . And since 
avoiding judicial preconceptions on legal issues is neither possible nor desirable, 
pretending otherwise by attempting to preserve the “appearance” of that type of 
impartiality can hardly be a compelling state interest either.38 
 
 34.  536 U.S. 765. 
 35.  It is the meaning:  
“[U]sed in the cases cited by respondents and amici for the proposition that an 
impartial judge is essential to due process.” Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523, 531–
534, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927) (judge violated due process by sitting in a case 
in which it would be in his financial interest to find against one of the parties); Aetna 
Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 822–825, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986) 
(same); Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 58–62, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 L.Ed.2d 267 (1972) 
(same); Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215–216, 91 S.Ct. 1778, 29 L.Ed.2d 423 
(1971) (per curiam) (judge violated due process by sitting in a case in which one of the 
parties was a previously successful litigant against him); Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 
899, 905, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997) (would violate due process if a judge 
was disposed to rule against defendants who did not bribe him in order to cover up the 
fact that he regularly ruled in favor of defendants who did bribe him); In re 
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 137–139, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955) (judge violated 
due process by sitting in the criminal trial of defendant whom he had indicted). 
White, 536 U.S. at 776. 
 36.  Id. at 777 (emphasis omitted). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. White also considered a third meaning of impartiality—as open-mindedness that 
“seeks to guarantee each litigant, not an equal chance to win the legal points in the case, but at 
least some chance of doing so”—but did not determine whether this was a compelling interest. 
Id. at 778. 
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In short, White distinguishes between judges failing to apply legal 
rules equally to all parties (bad) and judges having views about what 
those legal rules should be (good). 
Not only is it good for judges to have views about what the 
legal rules should be (which can be called the judge’s “normative views 
about the law” or the judge’s “policy preferences”), judges’ normative 
views about the law may be especially detailed and nuanced because 
judges’ jobs immerse them in the law at a granular level. For instance, 
the average citizen might have broad normative views about the law 
like “consumer protection needs to be strengthened” or “consumer 
regulations on business have gone too far.” In contrast, a judge’s 
normative views might be as detailed as wanting a particular section 
of the federal Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act or state Consumer Sales 
Practices Act amended with specific language the judge thinks would 
best resolve a question that has divided courts interpreting the 
current statutory language. 
An even more important distinction between a judge’s 
normative views about the law and the average citizen’s is that judges 
sometimes have the power to conform the law to their normative 
views. That judges make law is a truism.39 As the Supreme Court said 
in White: 
 
 39.  “Post-realist jurisprudence must depart from the truism that judges make law and 
begin instead with the question of how they make law.” Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The 
Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 601, 636 (1993). That “we are 
all realists now” is so thoroughly accepted as to be a cliché. Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal 
Realism: Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 267 (1997); see also MORTON 
J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, 169–212 (1992) (arguing that 
legal realism's most important legacy was its challenge to the notion that law has an 
autonomous role separate from politics); Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of 
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 274 (1998) (“[T]he program of unmasking 
law as politics [was] central to American Legal Realism . . . .”); Jerry Elmer, Legal Realism, 
Legal Formalism and the D'Oench Duhme Doctrine: A Perspective on R.I. Depositors Econ. Prot. 
Corp. v. NFD, 53 R.I. B.J. 9, 11 (2004) (“Today, we are all Legal Realists. Being Realists, we 
understand two things: that judges do make law, not just find it, and that public policy 
considerations may properly enter into a judge's deliberations.”); Charles Gardner Geyh, 
Straddling the Fence Between Truth and Pretense: The Role of Law and Preference in Judicial 
Decision Making and the Future of Judicial Independence, 22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL'Y 435, 438, 444 (2008) (“In an age when ‘[w]e are all legal realists now,’ it is too late in the 
day to pretend that when judges adjudicate disputes between adversaries, both of whom support 
their positions with credible-seeming legal arguments, the value preferences of the judges never 
factor into the choices they make.”); Thomas W. Merrill, High-Level, “Tenured” Lawyers, 61 LAW 
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 88 (1998) (“We live in a post-Legal Realist Age, when most legal 
commentators take it for granted that law cannot be disentangled from politics and that legal 
judgment is driven by the political beliefs of the decisionmaker.”); Gary Peller, The Metaphysics 
of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1985) (“It is a commonplace that law is 
‘political.’ ”). 
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[The] complete separation of the judiciary from the enterprise of “representative 
government” might have some truth in those countries where judges neither make law 
themselves nor set aside the laws enacted by the legislature. It is not a true picture of 
the American system. Not only do state-court judges possess the power to “make” 
common law, but they have the immense power to shape the States’ constitutions as 
well. Which is precisely why the election of state judges became popular.40 
Our “American system” involves frequent and sometimes far-reaching 
judicial lawmaking. Judges “inevitably make the common law”41 and 
inevitably make law when interpreting vague or ambiguous statutory 
and constitutional provisions.42 The scope and impact of judicial 
lawmaking grows the higher a judge is in the court system. “All 
appellate judges are, as one of them puts it, ‘occasional legislators’ and 
justices on our federal and state supreme courts are tremendously 
important and powerful lawmakers.”43 
Given that our “American system” gives judges, particularly 
high-court judges, significant discretion to make law, is it sometimes 
legitimate for judges to use that discretion to conform the law to their 
policy preferences? I believe so. For example, when a state’s highest 
court confronts an issue of first impression entirely within the 
common law—clearly untouched by statute, regulation, or 
constitutional provision—I believe the judges on that high court 
properly give significant weight to their own views about what the law 
on that issue should be. That is an example of legitimate judicial 
lawmaking. In contrast, a trial judge who is so eager to conform the 
law to his policy preferences that he knowingly rules contrary to clear, 
recent appellate court precedent is engaged in illegitimate 
lawmaking.44 In between these two polar cases are undoubtedly many 
intermediate cases in which reasonable people can disagree about 
whether a judge’s lawmaking was or was not legitimate, but when we 
agree that a particular example of judicial lawmaking was legitimate, 
then our sense of judicial impartiality should not be troubled by it. As 
White says, judicial impartiality “assures equal application of the law. 
That is, it guarantees a party that the judge who hears his case will 
apply the law to him in the same way he applies it to any other 
 
 40.  White, 536 U.S. at 784 (citation omitted). 
 41.  Ware, Originalism, supra note 7, at 172.  
 42.  Id. at 173–76; see also In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 40 (Or. 1990) (referring to a 
“democratic society that, like ours, leaves many of its final decisions, both constitutional and 
otherwise, to its judiciary”). 
 43.  Ware, Originalism, supra note 7, at 182. 
 44.  A judge who acts on the principle that he “would rather be right than affirmed ,” see, for 
example, Julie A. Brenizer Klosterman, Tribute to Judge Don J. Young, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 355, 
356 (1997) (“Judge Young said he would rather be right than affirmed”), likely deserves the 
epithet “judicial activist.”  
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party.”45 In contrast, judicial impartiality does not preclude judges 
from using their legitimate lawmaking discretion to change the law for 
everyone, even if the judges make the change to conform the law to 
the judges’ policy preferences. 
B. Judicial Impartiality and Judicial Campaign Contributions 
Following White, the previous Part of this Article concluded 
that the judicial impartiality we should seek is judges’ equal 
application of the law to all parties. In contrast, the judicial 
impartiality we should not seek is judges’ refraining from using their 
legitimate lawmaking discretion to try to conform the law to their 
policy preferences. 
We can apply this distinction in the context of judicial 
campaign contributions. If a contribution causes a judge to apply a 
legal rule differently to the contributor than the judge would to 
another otherwise similarly situated party, then the contribution 
caused the judge to violate judicial impartiality. Thinking 
systemically, if judicial campaign contributions cause a significant 
number of judges to apply legal rules differently to their contributors 
than to otherwise similarly situated parties, then that judicial election 
system violates judicial impartiality. In contrast, if judicial campaign 
contributions cause a significant number of judges to share the 
contributors’ views about the content of the law—e.g., “tort liability is 
too burdensome on business” or “possession of marijuana should not 
be punished harshly”—that is consistent with judicial impartiality. 
More broadly, if, for example, southern states’ judicial campaign 
contributions cause the election of more conservative judges while 
northern states’ judicial campaign contributions cause the election of 
more progressive judges, this scenario is also consistent with judicial 
impartiality. 
Of course, in all these scenarios what is “caused” by judicial 
campaign contributions, as opposed to by other causes, may be very 
difficult to determine.46 The point is that with respect to advancing 
judicial impartiality—properly and narrowly understood as “equal 
application of the law”47—we need not determine whether campaign 
 
 45.  White, 536 U.S. at 775–76.  
 46.  CHRIS W. BONNEAU & MELINDA GANN HALL, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 133 
(2009) (“Overall, we find exactly what studies of elections to nonjudicial offices have determined: 
that big spending is important in reelection campaigns but is only one of the many important 
factors that affect how well incumbents who are seeking reelection do with voters on election 
day.”). 
 47.  White, 536 U.S. at 776. 
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contributions cause the election of more conservative judges in one 
state or more progressive judges in another state, and we need not 
determine whether campaign contributions tend to cause the election 
of more judges whose views on businesses’ tort liability more closely 
resemble those of the Chamber of Commerce or the plaintiffs’ bar. In 
contrast, with respect to advancing judicial impartiality, we do need to 
determine whether campaign contributions cause a significant 
number of judges to apply legal rules differently to their contributors 
than to otherwise similarly-situated parties. That is, we need to 
determine whether campaign contributions cause a significant 
number of judges to depart from equal application of the law.48 
To put it another way, judicial impartiality requires a system 
that largely prevents campaign contributors from buying favorable 
outcomes in their cases but does not require a system that largely (or 
even slightly) prevents campaign contributors from buying changes in 
the content of legal rules that will apply to a range of cases.49 I made 
this distinction a few years before White in an article entitled Money, 
Politics and Judicial Decisions, in which I distinguished between 
judicial campaign contributors “buying justice [outcomes] in individual 
cases involving the contributor,”50 and “buying legal policy [the 
content of a legal rule] that affects a range of cases not involving the 
contributor.”51 As to buying outcomes in individual cases, I quoted 
Paul Carrington describing “celebrated occasions . . . when very large 
[judicial campaign] contributions were made by lawyers or parties who 
thereafter secured large favorable judgments,”52 and I flatly 
condemned such “excessive accountability to campaign contributors.”53 
When a judge rules in favor of a contributor, I wrote, “some will 
suspect that ‘justice is for sale,’ i.e., the judge is ‘owned’ by the 
contributor.”54 In other words, some will suspect the judge has failed 
to apply legal rules to the contributor in the same manner as the judge 
would apply those rules to an identical case involving only 
noncontributors. 
 
 48.  If we cannot determine this with empirical data, then I suppose we are left with our 
instincts about human nature. See infra Part III.B, notes 73–82 and accompanying text 
(disclosing mine). 
 49.  Admittedly, if we define the relevant “policy” narrowly enough, then it is likely to apply 
only to one case, so there could be close cases not easily resolved by the distinction I draw.  
 50.  Ware, supra note 8, at 652. 
 51.  Id. 
52  Id. at 653 (quoting Paul Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic 
Accountability in Highest State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 92 (1998)). 
 53.  Ware, supra note 8, at 653. 
 54.  Id. at 652–53. 
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In contrast, I distinguished situations “[w]hen the campaign 
contributor is not a single lawyer or litigant, but rather a large group 
of people who band together to advance their political philosophy.”55 
Whereas “a single contributor may seek only victories in cases in 
which the contributor appears as a party or lawyer[,] . . . an interest 
group may have a broad policy agenda, such as protecting the 
environment or deregulating the economy.”56 
Such an interest group may contribute to the campaigns of judges who share its political 
philosophy, just as it may contribute to the campaigns of like-minded candidates for 
other public offices[,] . . . [affecting] the results in many cases in which the winning 
parties and lawyers are not members of the interest group. In short, the interest group 
succeeds, not by buying justice [outcomes] in individual cases, but by buying policy [the 
content of a legal rule] that influences a range of cases.57 
Although buying the outcome of a particular case involving the 
contributor violates judicial impartiality (“equal application of the 
law,”) buying policy that treats all cases alike does not: 
Buying justice in individual cases violates the principle that courts should apply legal 
rules without regard to the identities of the parties and lawyers who happen to be 
involved in a particular case. This principle of treating like cases alike is crucial to many 
widely-shared conceptions of justice. While buying justice violates the principle of 
treating like cases alike, buying policy does not. Buying policy changes legal rules, but 
changes them for everybody. Contributors who buy policy must still live under the same 
rules as everybody else. For this reason, buying judge-made policy through judicial 
campaign contributions is not as bad as buying justice in particular cases through 
judicial campaign contributions. In fact, buying policy through judicial campaign 
contributions may not be bad at all. It is not easy to condemn contributors who buy policy 
through judicial campaign contributions without endorsing the myth that courts are 
apolitical and do not make policy. The Legal Realists exploded that myth and showed 
that judges do make policy. This is especially true of judges on states’ highest courts. 
Should not interest groups be as free to buy judge-made policy through campaign 
contributions as they are to buy governor-made and legislator-made policy through 
campaign contributions?58 
To the extent we support “representative democracy,”59 if we have 
judicial elections (and I do not think we should60), then we should hope 
 
 55.  Id. at 654. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. 654–55 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 59.  Nev. Comm'n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. 2343, 2353 (2011) (stating that citizens 
helping candidates whose positions correspond with their own is one of the “mechanisms that 
sustain representative democracy”). 
 60.  I prefer the indirect democracy of a senate confirmation appointment process to the 
direct democracy of contestable elections. Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri Plan in National 
Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751, 772–74 (2009); see also Richard A. Posner, Judicial Autonomy in 
a Political Environment, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 3–5 (2006) (endorsing Joseph Schumpeter as “[t]he 
best theorist of our actual existing democratic system”). 
The election of judges violates Schumpeter's conception of democratic rule. In that 
conception, the people vote only on the top officials, the ones who make the really 
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for correlations between the judge’s legitimate lawmaking and the 
policy preferences of her supporters, including her campaign 
contributors, which “might occur because judicial candidates have 
firmly established views and interest groups know each candidate’s 
views well enough to predict with great accuracy how that candidate 
will vote in various cases.”61 
It should not trouble our sense of judicial impartiality if a judge 
who receives her campaign contributions from conservatives exercises 
her legitimate lawmaking discretion to make the law more 
conservative, or if a judge who receives his campaign contributions 
from progressives exercises his legitimate lawmaking discretion to 
make the law more progressive. Nor should it trouble our sense of 
judicial impartiality if a judge who receives her campaign 
contributions from the Chamber of Commerce exercises her legitimate 
lawmaking discretion to try to lower businesses’ tort liability, or if a 
judge who receives his campaign contributions from the plaintiffs’ bar 
exercises his legitimate lawmaking discretion to try to raise 
businesses’ tort liability. 
As the Supreme Court said in the 2011 case of Nevada Comm’n 
on Ethics v. Carrigan: 
As a general matter, citizens voice their support and lend their aid [to a candidate] 
because they wish to confer the powers of public office on those whose positions 
correspond with their own. That dynamic, moreover, links the principles of participation 
and representation at the heart of our democratic government. Just as candidates 
announce positions in exchange for citizens’ votes, so too citizens offer endorsements, 
advertise their views, and assist political campaigns based upon bonds of common 
purpose. These are the mechanisms that sustain representative democracy.62 
 
consequential decisions, so that the people have some sense of whether those are the 
officials they want ruling them. The people are not busy monitoring the activities of 
the civil servants. That is not their function. They are not to waste their time trying to 
master issues and to figure out whether the dog catcher is catching enough dogs. 
. . . 
 [T]he election of judges even at the state or local level is contrary to the core of 
Schumpeter's insight, which is that we do not want our citizens to spend their time 
trying to master technical issues of governance. That is not an efficient division of 
labor. Most of what courts do is opaque to people who are not lawyers. It is completely 
unrealistic to think that the average voter will ever know enough about judicial 
performance to be able to evaluate judicial candidates intelligently. 
Id. at 5. For a contrary view, see BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 46, at 138:  
In sum, appointment systems merely relocate politics from the electorate to political 
elites, allow judges to decide cases based on personal preferences (whether consistent 
with the rule of law or not, whether unbiased or not), and create serious issues of 
legitimacy at the state level when sitting justices engage in improper conduct or 
consistently make decisions not supported in law. 
 61.  Stephen J. Ware, Money, Politics and Judicial Decisions: A Case Study of Arbitration 
Law in Alabama, 15 J.L. & POL. 645, 661 (1999) 
 62.  Carrigan, 131 S. Ct. at 2353 (citations omitted). 
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To accept this common-sense observation with respect to the selection 
of legislators and governors but not judges is to fight for the myth that 
judges do not make law and therefore should be apolitical. 
Unfortunately, many lawyers (including judges) who surely 
know that judges have legitimate discretion to make law nevertheless 
seek to perpetuate the myth that judges are not lawmakers when the 
public’s belief in this myth will serve the self-interests of lawyers. 
[M]any judges and lawyers are still reluctant to acknowledge publicly the inevitability of 
judicial lawmaking. In fact, judges and lawyers sometimes publish statements that tend 
to conceal from the public the fact that judges make law—for example, statements 
describing the judicial role in a way that omits the lawmaking part of this role. These 
omissions are especially common in debates over the Missouri Plan, a method of judicial 
selection that divides the power to appoint judges between the governor and the bar.63 
In short, judicial selection is an important topic on which we should be 
alert to counter lawyers who perpetuate the myth that judges do not 
make law and therefore should be apolitical. And within the topic of 
judicial selection, we should be especially alert to lawyers 
perpetuating this myth when they are advancing a selection system 
that favors them or when they are expressing concerns about a 
selection system that treats a lawyer like any other citizen. Of the 
three common judicial selection systems in the United States, the only 
one that favors lawyers is the Missouri Plan (sometimes 
propagandistically touted as “merit selection”64) which allows only 
lawyers to pick some members of the nominating commission that 
restricts the governor’s choice of judicial candidates.65 The bar tends to 
support this lawyer-favoring system.66 In contrast, the other two 
common methods of judicial selection around the fifty states—election 
of judges and appointment of judges by democratically elected 
officials—make the vote of a lawyer worth no more than the vote of 
nonlawyer.67 
 
 63.  Originalism, supra note 7, at 166. 
 64.  See Michael R. Dimino, The Futile Quest for a System of Judicial “Merit” Selection, 67 
ALB. L. REV. 803 (2004) (“Merit selection—purely, so far as I can tell, [is] a propagandistic 
misnomer . . . .”). 
 65.  Ware, supra note 60, at 758–64.  
 66.  See ABA MODEL CODE OF JUD. CONDUCT, Canon 5(C)(2), cmt (2007) (“[M]erit selection 
of judges is a preferable manner in which to select the judiciary”); ABA COMMISSION ON 
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY 96 (1997): 
The American Bar Association strongly endorses the merit selection of judges, as 
opposed to their election . . . . Five times between August 1972 and August 1984 the 
House of Delegates has approved recommendations stating the preference for merit 
selection and encouraging bar associations in jurisdictions where judges are elected 
. . . to work for the adoption of merit selection and retention. 
 67. See Stephen J. Ware, The Missouri Plan in National Perspective, 74 MO. L. REV. 751, 
754–55 (2009): 
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Thus, when lawyers express concern about judicial elections, 
we should be alert to the possibility that such lawyers are trying to 
empower themselves by replacing judicial elections with a version of 
the Missouri Plan, and are doing so by perpetuating the myth that 
judges do not make law and therefore should be apolitical. In other 
words, when lawyers express concern about judicial elections they 
should be met with skepticism about lawyer self-interest 
masquerading as public-regarding concern for judicial impartiality 
and the integrity of the judicial system. And this skepticism should 
heighten when lawyers complain that judicial elections tend to 
politicize the judiciary because that complaint tends to imply that 
“judge” is not the sort of office—a lawmaker’s office—ordinarily filled 
by a political process.68 
The bar’s efforts to replace judicial elections with the Missouri 
Plan have not fared well over the last several decades,69 so the bar’s 
attention has often turned to Plan B—taming judicial elections 
through codes of judicial conduct and other laws.70 Just as bar efforts 
 
Although not as populist as the direct democracy of contestable judicial elections, 
senate confirmation does make judicial selection indirectly accountable to the people 
because, at the federal level, the people elect their senators and, through the Electoral 
College, the President. Similarly, in states that use this method of judicial selection, 
the people elect their governors and state senators. 
In other words, senate confirmation is—like contestable elections—fundamentally 
democratic . . . . Senate confirmation is democratic because it facilitates the “rule of 
the majority” by adhering to the principle of one-person-one-vote. At the federal level, 
one-person-one-vote is tempered by federalism, . . . [b]ut at the state level nothing 
similarly tempers the democratic nature of senate confirmation. In those states in 
which the governor may appoint to the court whomever he or she wants, subject only 
to confirmation by a popularly elected body . . . , judicial selection is laudably 
democratic because governors and state senators are elected under the principle of 
one-person-one-vote . . . . [M]embers of the bar get no special powers. Again, a lawyer's 
vote is worth no more than any other citizen's vote. 
 68.  As noted above, I believe this office should be filled through the indirect democracy of 
senate confirmation rather than through direct election by the citizenry. See supra note 60. 
 69. See Seth Andersen, Examining the Decline in Support for Merit Selection in the States, 
67 ALB. L. REV. 793 (2004) (stating that the support for “merit selection” has been declining over 
the past decades, and also that the last time a state adopted some form of “merit selection” was 
New Mexico in 1988).  
 70.  See id. at 800–01. The American Bar Association (ABA) and other organizations 
“support appointive systems as the ultimate goal.” Id. However, the ABA, recognizing “the 
immediate need to reform judicial elections,” advocates changes, such as “use of elections only at 
the point of initial selection,” “use of retention elections,” “use of nonpartisan elections,” longer 
office terms, “expansion of voter guides on judicial candidates, and use of voluntary guidelines on 
judicial campaign conduct.” Id. Furthermore, “[t]he [ABA] has also introduced the concept of 
employing a ‘Judicial Eligibility Commission’ in elective systems to place more emphasis on 
professional qualifications and to ensure that voters have the benefit of candidate screening 
performed by a neutral, non-partisan, and diverse commission.” Id. For example, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court canon of judicial conduct invalidated in White prohibited candidates for judicial 
election from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues. See Republican Party 
of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002): 
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to end judicial elections should be met with skepticism about lawyer 
self-interest, so should bar efforts to tame judicial elections, especially 
if they tend to perpetuate the myth that judges, even state supreme 
court justices, do not make law and therefore should be apolitical. 
Particularly suspect are bar efforts to make judicial elections 
exclusively about candidates’ qualifications, experience, and 
professional abilities rather than at all about their policy 
preferences.71 A Williams-Yulee–like requirement that judicial 
campaign contributions be solicited by the candidate’s campaign 
committee, rather than by the candidate herself, may fit this “distract 
the public from the importance of the judicial candidates’ policy 
preferences” narrative. This is because such requirements can 
plausibly be seen as attempts by the bar to create the impression that 
the office of judge is less political—less lawmaking—than it is by 
separating the judicial candidate from the “political” task of soliciting 
campaign contributions. 
As to the practicalities of Williams-Yulee, I wonder if the 
distinction between campaign contributions solicited by campaign 
committees and by the judicial candidates themselves is more 
cosmetic than real because judges can usually easily learn who 
contributed to their campaign committees, and lawyers and litigants 
know that judges can easily learn who contributed to their campaign 
committees. For example, Judge Martha Daughtrey recalling her 
campaign for the Tennessee Supreme Court said: 
The thing that worried us was who was really interested in our election or any judicial 
election, and the answer is the lawyers. You end up trying to get money from the 
lawyers that are going to be actually appearing before you, which is a very 
uncomfortable position to be in. So we had a committee that was doing the money 
raising, and we took the position that we didn’t want to know who gave what. The 
problem was there was a financial contribution disclosure law in Tennessee that said 
that everybody who raised money running for political office had to sign a statement 
where the contributors were listed. How much they gave was on there, and we were 
supposed to sign it as being correct. We were kind of hoist on our petard at that point. 
. . . 
 
Respondents contend that this still leaves plenty of topics for discussion on the 
campaign trail . . . [including] a candidate's character, education, work habits, and 
how [he] would handle administrative duties if elected. Indeed, the Judicial Board has 
printed a list of preapproved questions which judicial candidates are allowed to 
answer. These include how the candidate feels about cameras in the courtroom, how 
he would go about reducing the caseload, how the costs of judicial administration can 
be reduced, and how he proposed to ensure that minorities and women are treated 
more fairly by the court system. 
Id. at 774 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 71. Id.  
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I would have wanted to be able to say I’m not in a position to decide a case based on who 
your lawyer is and whether that lawyer gave a contribution or not.72 
With judges’ ability to easily learn who contributed to their campaign 
committees, I fear the rule enacted by most states’ codes of judicial 
conduct—solicitations by a campaign committee instead of by the 
candidate—is mere window dressing.73 I doubt if it fools anybody. And 
if it does, that seems doubly pernicious. Bad enough to risk lawyers 
and potential litigants buying influence with the judge, but still worse 
for the bench and bar to try to hide that reality from the general 
public in an effort to maintain, as the Arkansas Supreme Court put it, 
“the public’s trust and confidence in the integrity of our judicial 
system.”74 
In other words, healthy skepticism toward bar self-interest in 
taming judicial elections should not make us comfortable with 
untamed judicial elections. Even judicial impartiality, narrowly and 
properly defined as “equal application of the law,” may well be 
threatened by judicial campaign contributions whether the 
contributions are solicited by the candidate personally or by her 
campaign committee. Frankly, I question whether the public should 
trust the integrity of a system in which judges’ campaign committees 
accept contributions from lawyers or parties who then appear before 
the judge. 
As the Oregon Supreme Court said, “The persons most actively 
interested in judicial races, and the persons who are the most 
consistent contributors to judicial campaigns, are lawyers and 
potential litigants. The impression created when a lawyer or potential 
litigant, who may from time to time come before a particular judge, 
 
 72.  See The Policy Implications of Campaign Contributions: A Discussion, 97 JUDICATURE 
279, 281–82 (2014) (statement of Senior Judge Martha Daughtrey, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Sixth Circuit). 
 73.  As the Oregon Supreme Court said in upholding a requirement that candidates 
soliciting campaign funds through a committee, “[T]he candidate is not seriously impaired either 
in the ability to solicit and receive funds.” In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d 31, 40 (Or. 1990). 
 74.  Simes v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n, 247 S.W.3d 876, 882 (Ark. 
2007). In contrast to White, see supra text at notes 45–48, the Arkansas Supreme Court defined 
judicial impartiality to mean not only “lack of bias for or against either party” but also “open-
mindedness, guaranteeing each litigant at least some chance to win the legal points in the case.” 
Simes, 247 S.W.3d at 881. The Arkansas Supreme Court explained that the solicitation ban 
would ensure judicial impartiality and “the open-mindedness of judges” by “diminishing the 
possibility that judges, once in office, will be pressured to decide issues in favor of those who 
financially supported their campaign.” Id. From the other side of the bench, the solicitation ban 
avoids the appearance of impropriety, so that “solicited individuals” would not be placed “in a 
position to fear retaliation if they fail[ed] to financially support that candidate.” Id. at 882. Thus, 
attorneys would “not feel pressured to support certain judicial candidates in order to represent 
their clients,” and the public would not feel forced “to search for an attorney in part based upon 
the criteria of which attorneys have made the obligatory contributions.” Id. 
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contributes to the campaign of that judge is always unfortunate.”75 
Unless there is objective evidence suggesting that the individual 
lawyer or potential litigant is supporting the judge because of the 
judge’s policy preferences,76 it appears to me “that the lawyer or 
potential litigant either expects to get special treatment from the 
judge or, at the least, hopes to get such treatment.”77 As Paul 
Carrington pithily says:  
Judicial candidates receive money from lawyers and litigants appearing in their courts; 
rarely are there contributions from any other source. Even when the amounts are 
relatively small, the contributions look a little like bribes or shake-downs related to the 
outcomes of past or future lawsuits. . . . There have been celebrated occasions . . . when 
very large contributions were made by lawyers or parties who thereafter secured large 
favorable judgments or remunerative appointments such as receiverships.78  
I cannot help but conclude with Erwin Chemerinsky that 
judicial campaign contributions from lawyers and litigants “risk both 
the reality of undue influence and the appearance of impropriety.”79 
For these reasons, I fear that judicial campaign contributions 
pose a serious risk of causing a significant number of judges—perhaps 
unconsciously—to apply legal rules differently to their contributors 
than to otherwise similarly situated parties. I cannot point to 
significant data to warrant this fear. As Ronald Rotunda says, 
“[o]bviously we do not want judges to treat parties or lawyers 
differently because of contributions that the judges did or did not 
receive . . . . Yet, while the assertion of linkage is common, it is 
surprisingly difficult to prove.”80 My worry that some judges treat 
 
 75.  In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d at 41.  
 76.  Such evidence might include the judge belonging to the political party that receives the 
vast majority of the lawyer’s or potential litigant’s contributions to campaigns for nonjudicial 
office. In contrast, if the lawyer or potential litigant does not contribute to nonjudicial 
campaigns, then we should be very suspicious of the contributor’s motives behind a judicial 
campaign contribution.  
 77.  In re Fadeley, 802 P.2d at 41. 
 78.  Paul Carrington, Judicial Independence and Democratic Accountability in Highest 
State Courts, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79, 91–92 (1998) (footnotes omitted). “A fundamental 
difference exists between judicial and legislative offices in this respect because judges decide the 
rights and duties of individuals even when they are making policy; hence any connection 
between a judge and a person appearing in his or her court is a potential source of mistrust.” Id.  
 79.  Erwin Chemerinsky, Preserving an Independent Judiciary: The Need for Contribution 
and Expenditure Limits in Judicial Elections, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 133, 134 (1998). 
 80.  Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutionalizing Judicial Ethics: Judicial Elections After 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, Caperton, and Citizens United, 64 ARK. L. REV. 1, 17 
(2011); see also BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 46, at 129:  
[G]iven the notable absence of any identifiable crises of legitimacy in the states that 
have hosted competitive judicial elections for decades, we wonder if the real crisis is 
not the unrelenting assaults on the democratic process by judicial reform advocates 
and their never-ending cries that elections are poisoning the well of judicial 
independence and legitimacy . . . .  
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parties or lawyers differently because of campaign contributions rests 
not on empirical proof but on intuitions about human nature—what 
we might call a secular belief in Original Sin. As Kant put it, “Out of 
the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was ever made.”81 
 
C. Reducing the Threat Judicial Campaign Contributions Pose to 
Judicial Impartiality 
If a Williams-Yulee–like rule diverting judicial campaign 
fundraising from candidates personally to their campaign committees 
is insufficient to minimize the risk of contributors buying influence 
over the outcomes of their cases, then are there other ways to 
accomplish that goal without abolishing judicial elections? Brian 
Fitzpatrick and I list three possible solutions: “asking judges to recuse 
themselves from cases involving campaign donors, making campaign 
donations anonymous, and publicly financing judicial elections.”82 
These three—recusal, anonymity, and public financing—are discussed 
in turn. 
Judges recusing themselves from cases involving campaign 
donors seems prudent to minimize the risks of contributors buying 
influence over the outcomes of their cases. However, if such recusal 
was required, then a lawyer or potential litigant might contribute to a 
judge expected to rule against the litigant to disqualify the judge and 
thus get a different judge assigned to the case. In a two-party case, 
that problem might be solved by allowing the opposing party to choose 
whether the judge should recuse, but in multi-party cases the 
practicalities would get more complex, and opportunities for collusion 
among parties would abound. And even in two-party cases, if the judge 
recuses from cases involving campaign contributors, what about cases 
involving less direct help to the judge’s election? In Caperton v. A.T. 
 
Ware, supra note 8, at 661 (presenting data showing “a strong correlation” between the votes of 
Alabama Supreme Court justices on arbitration cases and whether their campaign funds came 
from business groups or plaintiffs’ lawyers); id.: 
[E]mphasiz[ing] that correlation does not prove causation. Knowing that there is a 
strong correlation between a justice’s source of campaign funds and how that justice 
votes in arbitration cases does nothing to explain why this occurs. It might occur 
because judicial candidates have firmly established views and interest groups know 
each candidate’s views well enough to predict with great accuracy how that candidate 
will vote in various cases. 
 81.  IMMANUEL KANT, IDEA FOR A UNIVERSAL HISTORY WITH A COSMOPOLITAN PURPOSE, in 
H. S. REISS, KANT, CAMBRIDGE TEXTS IN THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL THOUGHT (Cambridge 2d ed., 
1991) 
 82.  Brian Fitzpatrick & Stephen Ware, How Does Your State Select Its Judges?, INSIDE 
ALEC (American Legislative Exchange Council, D.C.), March 2011, at 9. 
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Massey Coal Co., the Supreme Court held that Due Process required 
recusal in a case involving, not contributions to the judge’s campaign, 
but independent expenditures criticizing the judge’s opponent.83 And 
those expenditures were not by the party (a corporation) but by the 
President of the party.84 Caperton helps us imagine difficult line-
drawing problems as new cases’ facts involve people increasingly 
remote from the party or lawyer before the judge helping the judge’s 
election in increasingly attenuated ways. In sum, recusal seems 
capable of contributing to a reduction in the risks of contributors 
buying influence over the outcomes of their cases but is not a panacea. 
Similarly, making judicial campaign contributions anonymous 
has potential to help, but I am not confident about it. I associate the 
idea of requiring anonymity in campaign contributions with Ian Ayres 
and his coauthors. They explain, “[A]nonymous donations through a 
system of blind trusts would make it harder for candidates to sell 
access or influence because they would never know which donors had 
paid the price.”85  
 
Knowledge about whether the other side actually performs his or her promise is an 
important prerequisite for trade. People—including political candidates—are less 
likely to deal if they are uncertain whether the other side performs. By keeping 
political candidates ignorant of their donors’ identities, we can disrupt the ‘influence 
selling’ market just as voting booth privacy disrupts the ‘vote buying’ market.86  
 
“So long as a politician cannot identify a given donor’s gift on 
an individual basis, the donor cannot reasonably expect to gain a 
private quid pro quo. As a consequence, he will continue giving large 
sums only when motivated by public-regarding considerations.”87 For 
these reasons, perhaps requiring anonymity for judicial campaign 
contributions is worth a try, and then we will have some experience 
from which to draw conclusions about practical challenges. 
The third possible way to minimize the risk of contributors 
buying influence over the outcomes of their cases is to finance judicial 
campaigns through tax dollars rather than private contributions.88 
 
 83.  556 U.S. 868, 888–90 (2009). 
 84.  Id. at 873. 
 85.  Ian Ayres & Jeremy Bulow, The Donation Booth: Mandating Donor Anonymity to 
Disrupt the Market for Political Influence, 50 STAN. L. REV. 837, 838 (1998). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Bruce Ackerman & Ian Ayres, The New Paradigm Revisited, 91 CAL. L. REV. 743, 746 
(2003). 
 88.  See Charles Gardner Geyh, Publicly Financed Judicial Elections: An Overview, 34 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 1467, 1476 (2001).  
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Four states have such programs: Wisconsin,89 North Carolina,90 New 
Mexico,91 and West Virginia.92 However, opponents of public funding 
object that it “ ‘forces taxpayers to contribute to candidates who they 
do not support’ ”93 and “argue that spending limitations on candidates 
who participate . . . are an unconstitutional restriction on free 
speech.”94 Another danger of public financing is that its “spending 
limits simply would reinforce the incumbency advantage by not 
permitting challengers to spend enough money to gain voter 
familiarity.”95 On the other hand, public funding may do little more 
than make the flow of political money more circuitous because while 
“public financing may reduce private contributions to candidates,” it 
does “not eliminate any of the money raised and spent by independent 
groups,” so “public financing may not reduce the total sums of money 
spent in campaigns (even with spending limits on candidates) but may 
simply shift spending from one set of political actors to another.”96 
Former chair of the Federal Election Commission, Bradley Smith,97 
concludes that “the United States remains one of the healthiest 
democracies, despite, or perhaps because of, its reliance on private 
financing of campaigns.”98 
 
 89.  See Michael W. Bowers, Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns: Practices and 
Prospects, 4 NEV. L.J. 107, 117 (2003). 
 90.  See Brian P. Troutman, Part Over? The Politics of North Carolina’s “Nonpartisan” 
Judicial Elections, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1762, 1763, 1772 (2008); see also Doug Bend, North Carolina’s 
Public Financing of Judicial Campaigns: A Preliminary Analysis, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 597, 
599 (2005). 
 91.  Thomas J. Cole, First Judge Elected with Public Financing, ALBUQUERQUE J. (NOV. 17, 
2014, 12:05 AM), http://www.abqjournal.com/497234/news/nm-news/first-judge-elected-with-
public-financing-in-new-mexico.html, archived at http://perma.cc/R27A-V8UY. 
 92.  John O’Brien, Legislature Passes Public Financing Bill for SC Elections, WEST 
VIRGINIA RECORD (Apr. 15, 2013, 12:03 PM), http://wvrecord.com/news/259285-legislature-
passes-public-financing-bill-for-sc-elections, archived at http://perma.cc/WWA3-ZNT8. 
 93.  Bend, supra note 90, at 604 (quoting U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-453, 
EARLY EXPERIENCES OF TWO STATES THAT OFFER FULL PUBLIC FUNDING FOR POLITICAL 
CANDIDATES 6–7 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03453.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/W689-DKER. 
 94.  Bend, supra note 90, at 604. 
 95.  BONNEAU & HALL, supra note 46, at 102. 
 96.  Id. at 105.  
 97.  Bradley A. Smith, FEC.GOV, http://www.fec.gov/members/former_members/smith/ 
smith.shtml (last visited Dec. 29, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/6MXT-RFBW.  
 98.  Bradley A. Smith, Some Problems with Taxpayer-Funded Political Campaigns, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 591, 628 (1999). 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In a narrow doctrinal sense, Williams-Yulee is about the 
constitutionality of a requirement that a judicial candidate solicit 
campaign funds through her campaign committee, rather than 
personally. At the intermediate level, however, Williams-Yulee 
implicates questions about how judicial election campaigns should be 
funded. And at the broadest level, Williams-Yulee implicates the 
question whether to have judicial elections at all. My answer to that 
broadest question is no; we should not have judicial elections, 
although I disagree with most of my fellow lawyers about whether to 
replace judicial elections with appointment of judges by democratically 
elected officials, or by a combination of such officials and the bar. At 
the intermediate level, I doubt that funding for judicial election 
campaigns can be accomplished without posing significant risk to 
judicial impartiality or creating other important problems, which is 
one of the reasons why I want to eliminate judicial elections. As for 
the narrow doctrinal issue in Williams-Yulee, I leave that to First 
Amendment experts. 
 
